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QUESTIONING THE RELEVANCE OF
MIRANDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Richard A. Leo*

lNTRODUCTION1

Miranda v. Arizona2 is the most well-known criminal j ustice deci
sion - arguably the most well-known legal decision - in American
history. Since it was decided in 1966, the Miranda decision has
spawned voluminous newspaper coverage, political and legal debate,
and academic commentary. The Miranda warnings themselves have
become so well-known through the media of television that most peo
ple recognize them immediately.3 As Patrick Malone has pointed out,
the Miranda decision has added its own lexicon of words and phrases
to the American language.4 Perhaps with this understanding in mind,
George Thomas recently suggested that the Miranda warnings are
more well-known to school children than the Gettysburg address,5
foreshadowing the Supreme Court's statement in Dickerson v. United
States that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice
to the point where the warnings have become part of our national cul
ture. "6 But even this may be an understatement: beyond the borders of
the United States, the Miranda warnings may be more well known
than virtually any other feature of the American criminal j ustice sys
tem.
* Assistant Professor of Criminology, Law & Society and Assistant Professor of
Psychology and Social Behavior, University of California, Irvine. J.D. 1994, Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. 1994, University of California,
Berkeley.

1. I thank George Thomas, Charles Weisselberg, and Welsh White for their helpful
comments.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINALJUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 51-52 (1993).
4. Patrick Malone, You Have the Right to Remain Silent: Miranda After Twenty Years,
55 AM SCHOLAR 367 (1986).
.

5. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III, eds., 1998). As George Thomas points out elsewhere, "the typical TV
viewer has heard Miranda warnings given hundreds of times, with no discernible effect on
the 'good guys' getting the confession from the guilty suspects." George Thomas, The End of
the Road for Miranda v. Arizona, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000).
6. 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
1000

Miranda in the Twenty-First Century

March 2001]

1001

From all this attention, one might reasonably infer that the impact
of the Miranda decision - on police, on criminal suspects, on confes
sion and conviction rates, on the American public - continues to be
enormous. The purpose of this Essay is to question assumptions about
the effects of Miranda and to suggest that legal scholars devote more
energy to the empirical study of other, more significant, aspects of po
lice interrogation and confessions. While it may have initially exerted
a substantial impact on police interrogation practices and the criminal
j ustice system, Miranda may no longer be as relevant as it once was to
understanding how police interrogate, why suspects do or do not con
fess, and which legal reforms best serve the imperatives of crime con
trol, due process and j ustice. In Part I, I review two generations of
studies assessing Miranda's impact to set forth what we know and do
not know about the ongoing macro-level impact of Miranda. In Part
II, I take a more micro-level view to analyze the probable impact of
Miranda on the central actors in the criminal j ustice system in the
twenty-first century. Both Parts I and II conclude that Miranda has
had a very limited impact (positive or negative) on the criminal justice
system in the last two decades. Finally, in Part III, I conclude with
some observations about the importance of mandatory video-taping of
police interrogations and the future of legal scholarship on police in
terrogation practices and confession law. It is not the purpose of this
Essay to provide any hard and fast answers to enduring and difficult
questions, but rather to question our assumptions about Miranda's
real world relevance in the twenty-first century and to suggest less
popular, but arguably far more important, directions for policy innova
tion and future scholarship in this area.
I.
A.

THE MIRANDA IMPACT STUDIES

First Generation Studies (1966-1973)

In the three decades prior to Miranda, there had been relatively lit
tle field research on police interrogation practices in America.7 It was
thus hardly surprising that the Warren Court in 1966 relied on police
training manuals - rather than empirical studies - to describe the
techniques and methods of police interrogation in America. Empha
sizing the absence of first-hand knowledge of actual police interroga
tion practices at the time, the Warren Court in Miranda noted that:
"Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy

7. For some pre Miranda studies that included an analysis or discussion of observations
of actual interrogations, see WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970); AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES:
PILOT PROJECT REPORT (1957); Edward Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law - from
Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL. L. REV. 1 1 (1962).
-
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and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation room."8
In the years immediately following the Miranda decision, scholars
published approximately a dozen empirical studies that sought to fill
in this gap.9 These studies relied on a variety of methodologies (e.g.,
participant observation, survey research, interviews, analysis of case
files) and were undertaken in a variety of locations (e.g., Pittsburgh,
New Haven, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Denver, Madison, and
elsewhere). In the main, these studies sought to identify and analyze
police implementation of, and compliance with, the new Miranda re
quirements; police attitudes toward Miranda; the effect of the Miranda
warning and waiver regime on police and suspect behavior during in
terrogation; and the impact of Miranda on confession, clearance, and
conviction rates.
Several scholars have catalogued and analyzed the findings of the
first generation Miranda studies.10 Although an in-depth discussion of
these studies is beyond the scope of this Essay, several general pat
terns are worth briefly noting. First, in the initial aftermath of
Miranda, some police began immediately complying with Miranda,11

8. 384 U.S. 436, 448, 466 (1965).
9. See NEIL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT
OF MIRANDA (1971); John Griffiths & Richard Ayres, Faculty Note, A Postscript to the
Miranda Project, Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L. J. 300 (1967); Lawrence S.
Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENY. L.J. 1
(1970); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1968); David W. Neubauer,
Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103
(1974); Cyril D. Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interro
gation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity
to Comply, 3 DUKE L. J. 425 (1968); Roger C. Schaefer, Patrolman Perspectives on Miranda,
1971 LAW & THE Soc. ORD. 81 (1971); Richard Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr.,
Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 PITT. L. REV. 1 (1967); Otis Stephens et al.,
Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements,
39 TENN. L. REV. 407 (1972); Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact
of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the
Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973); Evelle J. Younger, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants
Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 255 (1966) [hereinafter Younger,
Interrogation]; Evelle J. Younger, Results of a Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's
Office of Los Angeles County Regarding the Effect of the Miranda Decision Upon the Prose
cution of Felony Cases, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 32 (1966) [hereinafter Younger, Results]. In addi
tion to these published studies, prosecutors' offices in several other cities conducted surveys
and ventured speculations of the confession rates in the period immediately prior and subse
quent to the Miranda decision. For a catalogue of these unpublished speculations, see Paul
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV., 387, 397-418
(1996).
10. Younger, Interrogation, supra note 9 at 33. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 632-645 (1996); Cassell, supra note
9, at 394-433; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516-538 (1996).
11. Younger, Interrogation, supra note 9, at 32.
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while others ignored the decision or failed to recite part or all of the
required warnings to suspects in custody.12 After a brief adjustment
period, however, virtually all police began to regularly comply with
the letter, though not always the spirit, of the fourfold warning and
waiver requirements.U Despite their compliance, however, many de
tectives resented the new Miranda requirements.14
Second, despite the fourfold warnings, suspects frequently waived
their Miranda rights and chose, instead, to speak to their interrogators.
Some researchers attributed this largely unexpected finding to the
manner in which detectives delivered the Miranda warnings,15 while
others attributed it to the failure of suspects to understand the mean
ing or significance of their Miranda rights.16
Third, once a waiver of rights had been obtained, the tactics and
techniques of police interrogation did not appear to change as a result
of Miranda. For example, Wald et al. observed in New Haven that
Miranda appeared to have little impact on police behavior during in
terrogation, since detectives continued to employ many of the psy
chological tactics of persuasion and manipulation that the Warren
Court had deplored in Miranda.17 Stephens reported that while most
detectives in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Macon, Georgia, issued for
malized warnings, Miranda did not change the nature and role of the
interrogation process.18

12. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1550.
13. Id. at 1550-51; Leiken, supra note 9, at 9-10, 14, 47 (finding "strict compliance with
[Miranda's] formal requirements."). Leiken's study also suggested that police sometimes
ignored suspects' refusals to waive rights. Id. at 30.
14. For example, police interrogators in New Haven viewed the requirements as artifi
cial, unnecessary and generally impugning of police integrity, while police detectives in
Macon, Georgia, and Knoxville, Tennessee, almost uniformly felt that Miranda had ham
pered their ability to investigate and solve crime effectively by undermining the authorita
tiveness of their relations with criminal suspects. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1610-1 1;
Stephens et al., supra note 9, at 423. Wisconsin police also viewed Miranda as harmful and
drastic. MILNER, supra note 9, at 219.
15. For example, Wald et al. believed that New Haven detectives often intoned the
warnings in a mechanical, bureaucratic manner so as to trivialize their potential significance
and minimize their effectiveness, sometimes coaxing ambivalent suspects into waiving their
rights. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1552. Leiken argued that police used the very psychologi
cal pressures deplored by the Miranda court, including promises and threats to induce sus
pects to sign waiver forms and subsequently to elicit statements and confessions. Leiken, su
pra note 9, at 37-41.
16. For example, Medalie argued that a significant number of suspects in the District of
Columbia did not understand the right to silence or the right to appointed counsel. Medalie,
supra note 9, at 1374-75. Wald et al. and Leiken argued that many suspects in New Haven
and Denver, respectively, were unable to grasp the meaning of their Miranda rights. Wald et
al., supra note 9, at 1554-55, 1614; Leiken, supra note 9, at 14-15.
17. Wald et al., supra note 9, at 1542-43.
18. Stephens et al., supra note 9, at 430.
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Fourth, suspects· continued to provide detectives with confessions
and incriminating statements. In some studies, however, researchers
reported· a lower rate of confession following the Miranda decision
than prior to Miranda. For example, Seeburger and Wettick reported
that in Pittsburgh, the confession rate dropped from 54.4% prior to
Miranda to 37.5% after Miranda, though the specific amount varied
by the type of crime reported.19 Yet other researchers reported only a
marginal decrease in the confession rate. For example, Witt reported
that in "Seaside City" (a pseudonym for a beach city in Los Angeles)
the confession rate dropped only two percent (from 69% before the
Miranda decision to 67% after the Miranda decision).20 And one re
searcher even reported an increase in the confession rate of approxi
mately 10% after Miranda.21
Fifth, researchers reported that clearance and conviction rates had
not been adversely affected by the new Miranda requirements. For
example, even though Seeburger and Wettick found a 17% decline in
the confession rate of suspects in Pittsburgh, they -did not find a corre
sponding decline in the conviction rate.22 Other researchers reported
significant, if temporary, declines in clearance rates, but also noted
that conviction rates remained relatively constant.23 Moreover, even
where conviction rates dropped along with clearance rates, the drop
was not significant. For example, in his study of "Seaside City, " Witt
reported a 3% decline in the clearance rate and a 9% decline in the
conviction rate (from 92% to 84%) after Miranda became law.24 If
there was a significant cost to Miranda according to first generation
impact researchers, it appeared to be that Miranda may have caused
the interrogation rate to drop and may also have been responsible for
lessening the effectiveness of the collateral functions of interrogation
such as identifying accomplices, clearing crimes and recovering stolen
property.25
Regardless, the consensus that emerged from the first generation
of Miranda impact studies was that the Miranda rules have had only a
marginal effect on the ability of the police to successfully elicit confes-

1 9. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 9, at 1 1 .
20. Witt, supra note 9 , a t 325.
2 1 . Younger, Interrogation, supra note 9, at 260.
22. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 9, at 20. A confession is not always necessary for
conviction, and thus a decline in the confession rate will not inevitably produce a decline in
the conviction rate.
23. For example, Milner notes in his study of four Wisconsin police departments that, in
the year following Miranda, the clearance rate went down significantly (13-51 %), but that
the conviction rate remained relatively constant for the two departments that provided
Milner with statistics. MILNER, supra note 9, at 218-19.
24. Witt, supra note 9, at 328-29.
25. Id. at 332.
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sions and on the ability of prosecutors to win convictions, despite the
fact that some detectives continued to perceive that Miranda's impact
was substantial.26 The general view of these studies is not merely that
Miranda has failed to adversely affect the ability of police to control
crime, but also that, in practice, the requirement of standard Miranda
warnings failed to achieve the goal or impact originally envisioned by
the Warren Court.
The first-generation Miranda impact researchers are to be com
mended for the efforts they expended in gathering data on Miranda's
real world impact in the immediate years after the case was decided.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the generalizability and con
temporary relevance of these findings are undermined by two key fac
tors. First, these studies are largely outdated. The data in each of the
first-generation Miranda impact studies was gathered during the first
three years following the Miranda decision in the mid-to-late 1960s.
Therefore, these studies arguably captured only the initial effects of
Miranda before police officers and detectives had fully adjusted to the
new procedures.27 Second, many of these studies are methodologically
weak, perhaps because they were virtually all conducted by lawyers or
law professors without any training in the research methods of social
science.28
B.

Second Generation Studies (1996-Present)

The first generation of Miranda impact studies had run their
course by 1973. For the next two decades, the social science and legal
community, with few exceptions,29 appeared to lose interest in the em
pirical study of Miranda's impact on criminal j ustice processes and
outcomes. Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been a second
flurry or generation of empirical Miranda impact studies. These stud-

26. Id. at 322-25.
27. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 506 ("(E]ven if we can assume that the studies give a
reliable picture of Miranda's costs thirty years ago, there is strong reason to believe that such
costs were transitory and that confession rates have since rebounded from any temporary
decline.").
28. As I have pointed out elsewhere:

[S]ome of the studies did not disaggregate the data they collected and thus lack any system
atic analysis between independent and dependent variables in their sample. Three of the
studies that did disaggregate their quantitative data failed to employ even the most elemen
tary statistical techniques to evaluate whether any of the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda dif
ferences observed were statistically significant. More fundamentally, several of the studies
suffer from selection and respondent biases that undermine the validity and generalizability
of their findings.
Leo, supra note 10, at 647 (citations omitted).
29. John Gruhl & Cassia Spohn, The Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rulings: Impact on
Local Prosecutors, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 29 (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to
Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
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ies might loosely be divided into two types: those that seek to assess
the quantitative impact of Miranda on confession, clearance, and con
viction rates; and those that qualitatively seek to assess Miranda's real
world impact on how police issue warnings and elicit waivers, whether
and how they comply with or circumvent Miranda's requirements, and
Miranda's effects on police interrogation methods and confessions.
Unlike their first generation counterparts , however, the second gen
eration impact studies have generated considerable interpretive dis
agreement, debate, and commentary.
The most well-known "debate" in the second-generation studies
has been between Paul Cassell and Stephen Schulhofer. Selectively re
analyzing the first generation impact studies, as well as several unpub
lished surveys conducted by prosecutors' offices in several cities im
mediately prior to and after Miranda, Cassell speculated in 1996 both
that Miranda has caused a 16% reduction in the confession rate and
that it is responsible for lost convictions in 3.8% of all serious criminal
cases.30 Utilizing such figures, Cassell concluded that, as a result of
Miranda, the government fails to obtain convictions in approximately
28,000 violent crime and 79,000 property crime cases each year and is
forced to settle for plea bargains on terms more favorable to criminal
defendants in a similar number of cases.31 Shortly after publishing
these figures, Cassell substantially revised them and argued that each
year 100,000 violent criminals (who would otherwise be convicted and
incarcerated) go free as a direct result of the Miranda requirements.32
Re-analyzing the same data,33 Stephen Schulhofer has speculated that
Miranda may have initially caused a 4.1 % drop in the confession rate
in the immediate post-Miranda period and a 0.78% drop in the convic
tion rate.34 Based on his analysis, Schulhofer has argued that "for all
practical purposes, Miranda's empirically detectable net damage to
law enforcement is zero."35
In a number of subsequent law review and newspaper articles,
Cassell has continued to argue that Miranda has s ubstantially de
pressed the confession rate and imposed significant costs on society by
allowing tens of thousands of guilty suspects to escape conviction. In a
study of prosecutorial screening sessions involving a sample of 219
suspects, Cassell found that 42.2% of the s uspects who were ques-

30. Cassell, supra note 9, at 437-438.
31. Id. at 440.
32. Paul Cassell, True Confessions About Miranda Legacy, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 1996,
at 22.
33. Schulhofer properly excludes the unpublished studies that Cassell had included in
his analysis of Miranda's quantitative effect. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 516-38.
34. Id. at 541-42.
35. Id. at 547.
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tioned gave incriminating statements, a confession rate that he argued
is far lower than pre-Miranda confession rates.36 Analyzing national
aggregate clearance data, Cassell has asserted that about one out of
every four violent crimes that was "cleared" before Miranda was not
cleared "after" Miranda, and has attributed the decline in clearance
rates to the Miranda decision.37 In a subsequent law review article
based on a multiple regression analysis of the time series of Federal
Bureau of Investigation reported national clearance rates,38 Cassell
and his co-author Richard Fowles claimed that Miranda caused clear
ance rates to drop sharply for certain crimes during the years 19661968, and argued that "[a]s many as 36,000 robberies, 82,000 burgla
ries, 163,000 larcenies, and 78,000 vehicle thefts remain uncleared each
year as a result of Miranda."39 Based on all of these studies, Cassell ar
gues not only that "Miranda has seriously harmed society by hamper
ing the ability of the police [to elicit the confessions necessary] to solve
crimes," but also that "Miranda may be the single most damaging
blow inflicted on the nation's ability to fight crime in the last half cen
tury."40
Though he has garnered considerable attention from some of the
nation's top law reviews, as well as the media, Cassell's quantitative
claims have not been generally accepted in either the legal or social
science community. Instead, numerous scholars, including myself,
have disputed Cassell's findings and/or inferences and have criticized
his objectivity,41 methodology,42 and conclusions.43 For example,

36. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV . 839, 869 (1996).
37. Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders,
90 Nw. L. RE V . 1084, 1090 (1996).
38. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective
on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
39. Id. at 1126.
40. Id. at 1132. In an interview with 60 Minutes, Cassell was less ambiguous, asserting
unequivocally that Miranda is "the most damaging blow inflicted on law enforcement in the
last half-century." 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 5, 1999). Elsewhere, Cassell
has stated that "there are literally hundreds of thousands of criminal cases that have not
been solved because of Miranda." Roger Parloff, Miranda on the Hot Seat, THE NEW YORK
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 26, 1999, at 84-86.
41. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat
Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 557 ("Paul
Cassell advances several logically flawed and empirically erroneous propositions. These
propositions appear to stem from Cassell's ideological commitments."); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 278, 278 (1996) ("Yet once
again, [Cassell's) arguments rest on selective descriptions of the data and - I am sorry to say
- indefensibly partisan characterizations of the underlying material."); George C. Thomas
III, Telling Half-Truths, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20 ("While Miranda is not immune
from questioning, advocacy cannot replace careful scholarship."); id. at 24 ("[S)cholars have
a duty to describe all the evidence and to acknowledge contrary interpretations if they are
widely held. Professor Cassell draws a one-sided picture of the evidence against Miranda.");
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 176 & n.332 (1998)
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Schulhofer has repeatedly criticized Cassell for selectively citing data,
presenting sources and quotes out of context, and advancing indefen
sibly partisan analyses.44 Schulhofer has also disputed some of
Cassell's factual assertions,45 provided alternative explanations for pat
terns in Cassell's data,46 and continued to argue that there is no em
pirical support for Cassell's claim that Miranda has measurably re
duced confession rates.47 Other scholars have criticized Cassell for
oversimplifying complicated issues,48 presenting speculation as fact,49

(suggesting that "one may question Cassell's motives" and pointing out that "Cassell has
presented his views as an advocate in litigation" and does not acknowledge "critiques of his
work or otherwise acknowledge that his empirical analyses are much disputed").
42. See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 176 (noting Cassell's "flawed methodolo
gies"); id. at 177 ("Cassell's work, with its dubious methods, sets a poor benchmark from
which to base a revision of Miranda's settled rules."); Thomas, supra note 41, at 21 ("Cassell
relies on flawed studies, while rejecting other studies that show little or no effect from
Miranda. His empirical theories and underlying methodologies have been strongly criti
cized."); Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 502 ("(A)t critical points in (Cassell's) analysis, data
are cited selectively, sources are quoted out of context, weak studies showing negative im
pacts are uncritically accepted, and small methodological problems are invoked to discredit a
no-harm conclusion when the same difficulties are present - to an even greater extent - in
the negative-impact studies that Cassell chooses to feature.").
43. Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 280 ("Like the statistics and quotations Cassell fea
tured in his original article, his national clearance-rate data have been isolated from their
context in order to support a dramatic but misleading claim."); Welsh S. White, What Is An
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2031 n.189 (1998) (stating that
"even if Cassell's calculations deserved to be taken seriously, his conclusions would be sub
ject to the criticism: garbage in, garbage out"); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375, 380 (1997) ("Cassell has clearly exaggerated the extent to which the
Miranda regime has hampered law enforcement.").
44. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 502 ("[A)t critical points in [Cassell's) analysis, data are
cited selectively, sources are quoted out of context, weak studies showing negative impacts
are uncritically accepted, and small methodological problems are invoked to discredit a no
harm conclusion when the same difficulties are present - to an even greater extent - in the
negative-impact studies that Cassell chooses to feature."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing in
the Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 21 ("Readers should understand that
these are simply advocacy numbers, derived from indefensibly selective accounts of the
available data."); Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 280 ("Like the statistics and quotations Cas
sell featured in his original article, his national clearance-rate data have been isolated from
their context in order to support a dramatic but misleading claim."). Elsewhere, Schulhofer
has described some of Cassell's empirical assertions about Miranda as "junk science of the
silliest sort." Alexander Nguyen, The Assault on Miranda, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10,
2000, at 59.
·

45. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda is Unjustified - And Harmful, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347, 358 (1997) (arguing that, while Professor Cassell claimed that clear
ance rates fell dramatically following Miranda, in fact, the number of violent crimes cleared
after Miranda did not decline at all).
46. For example, Schulhofer has argued that the cause of the declining clearance rate
was a decline in police resources relative to an increase in crime, not Miranda. Schulhofer,
supra note 41, at 281-85; Schulhofer, supra note 45, at 358-60.
47. Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 505-06; Schulhofer, supra note 45, at 353-55.
48. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 41, at 563 ("The problem with Cassell's impulse to quanti
fication . . . is that it oversimplifies complicated issues and inevitably presents speculation as
fact.").
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failing to address contrary evidence and widely held interpretations,50
and ultimately, for failing to demonstrate that Miranda has caused a
decline in confession, clearance or conviction rates.51
Despite the disagreements between Cassell and his many critics,
there appears to be relatively little dispute among second generation
researchers on several aspects of Miranda's real world effects. First,
police appear to issue and document Miranda warnings in virtually all
cases.52 Second, police appear to have successfully "adapted" to the
Miranda requirements.

Thus, in practice, police have developed

strategies that are intended to induce Miranda waivers.53 Third, police
appear to elicit waivers from suspects in roughly 80% of their interro
gations,54 though suspects with criminal records appear disproportion-

49. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 404 n.30
(1999) ("Cassell's attempt at informed quantification amounts to no more than elaborate
speculation. . . . ").
50. Weisselberg, supra note 41 , at 176 n.332 ("Cassell does not cite to Schulhofer's or
Donohue's critiques of his work or otherwise acknowledge that his empirical analyses are
much disputed.").
51. E.g., George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A
"Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 957 (1996) ("[N]othing in the
old studies or the new ones provides sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis that
Miranda has depressed the rate of confessions."); Arenella, supra note 43, at 380 ("Cassell
has clearly exaggerated the extent to which the Miranda regime has hampered law enforce
ment."); John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1 147 (1998) (questioning Cassell's assertion that Miranda caused a statistically signifi
cance drop in actual clearance rates). Weisselberg summarizes the heart of this critique:
John Donohue has analyzed the Cassell and Fowles study closely. As an initial matter,
Donohue notes that FBI clearance data have proven unreliable because, in addition to the
manipulation of clearance rates by local authorities, a perceived decline in clearance rates
may reflect nothing more than the improved reporting of crime. . . . Donohue also doubts
Cassell's and Fowles's conclusion that Miranda alone lies at the root of any perceived drop
in clearance rates in the late 1960s . . . . [Donohue concludes that Miranda] should not have a
substantial impact upon clearance rates because solving a crime clears it whether or not an
arrest or prosecution occurs, and Miranda only operates after a suspect is in custody. . . . In
the end, however, Cassell provides the wrong answers to the wrong questions.
Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 175-76.
52. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
276 (1996).
53. As Welsh White and I have written elsewhere:
Empirical data indicates that the police deliver the Miranda warnings in at least three ways.
First, the police may deliver the warnings in a neutral manner; second, they may de
emphasize the warnings' significance by delivering them in a manner that is designed to ob
scure the adversarial relationship between the interrogator and the suspect; and, third, they
may deliver the warnings in a way that communicates to the suspect that waiving his rights
will result in some immediate or future benefit for him.
Leo & White, supra note 49, at 432. See also Leo, supra note 10, at 658-65; DAVID SIMON,
HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 204-20 (1991) (describing an interrogation
of a suspect after he waived his Miranda rights).
54. Leo, supra note 52, at 276; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 860.
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ately likely to invoke their rights and terminate interrogation.ss
Fourth, in some jurisdictions police are systematically trained to vio
late Miranda by questioning "outside Miranda" (i.e., by continuing to
question suspects who have invoked the right to counsel or the right to
remain silent).s6 Finally, some researchers have argued that Miranda
eradicated the last vestiges of third degree interrogation present in the
mid-1960s, increased the level of professionalism among interrogators,
and raised public awareness of constitutional rights.s7
The second generation of Miranda impact research has been far
more spirited and engaging than the first round of studies. Yet despite
the new energy that empirically-oriented scholars have breathed into
the Miranda debate and despite the renewed calls for more empirical
research on Miranda's real world effects,ss the second generation of
Miranda impact scholarship may be at a close. Now that the Supreme
Court has resolved any questions about Miranda's constitutional un
derpinnings, it is highly unlikely that the Court will reconsider any
constitutional challenges to Miranda for many years, if not decades, to
come. As a result, there may be little incentive for either Miranda's
supporters or Miranda's critics to continue the difficult task of gath
ering and interpreting data on Miranda's measurable effects. The
Supreme Court in Dickerson made its own empirical assessments of
Miranda's impact when it stated that, "Miranda has become embed
ded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture,"s9 yet it did so without consider
ing any of the first or second generation research of Miranda's real

55. Leo, supra note 10, at 654-55; SIMON, supra note 53, at 210-11; see also Cassell &
Hayman, supra note 36, at 895-96. British research also demonstrates that suspects with prior
records are significantly more likely to remain silent or seek counsel. E.g., PAULA SOFrLEY,
HOME OFFICE RESEARCH UNIT, ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RESEARCH
STUDY NO. 4 POLICE INTERROGATION: AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY IN FOUR STATIONS

(1 980).
56. The interrogator's objective is to convince the suspect that he can talk to the inter
rogator without any fear that his words will be used against him. To achieve this goal, the
interrogator either may tell the suspect explicitly that nothing he says can be used against
him, implicitly communicate the same message through statements to the effect that the sus
pect's answers will be off the record, or tell the suspect that his statement will be used only
to help the interrogator understand what happened. The purpose of questioning outside
Miranda is to obtain a confession that may be used to impeach a suspect should he take the
stand at trial and may also be used to discover non-testimonial evidence against the suspect,
which also can be used at trial. Weisselberg, supra note 41 , at 189-92; Leo & White, supra
note 49, at 447-50; Charles Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1121 (2001).
57. Leo, supra note 10, at 668-74; SIMON, supra note 53, at 211.
58. E.g., George C . Thomas III, Is Miranda A Real World Failure? A Plea for More (and
Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E.
Harcourt, Foreword, Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitlltional
Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000).
59. 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
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world effects. This result is particularly surprising in light of the fact
that Paul Cassell litigated the challenge to Miranda before the
Supreme Court in Dickerson. That the Court ignored even the
Miranda impact research of one of the primary litigants might, under
standably, dissuade advocates on both sides of the Miranda debate
from pursuing another round of empirical research on Miranda's real
world effects on the interrogation process, public attitudes, or confes
sion and conviction rates. After all, for the foreseeable future,
Miranda is here to stay.
II.

MIRANDA'S IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS
A.

Introduction

The purpose of the preceding section was to describe the main
findings from two generations of Miranda impact studies in the last
thirty-five years. The purpose of this section is to qualitatively evalu
ate Miranda's seeming real world effects on the various actors, agen
cies, and institutions that comprise the criminal j ustice system. A nar
row focus on Miranda's quantitative impact on such macro-level
statistics as confession, clearance, and conviction rates may cause us to
lose sight of the more mundane impact of Miranda on everyday crimi
nal j ustice actors and processes.60 Unlike most Miranda impact studies,
this Essay seeks to break down Miranda's impact (or lack of impact)
on s ub-parts of the criminal j ustice system in order to arrive at a better
understanding of Miranda's impact (or lack of impact) on the whole.
I argue that an examination of Miranda's effect on various institu
tional actors supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact may be
relatively inconsequential in practice and may have been overstated in
much second-generation scholarship. However, I do not profess to
provide hard and fast answers in this short Essay. I therefore offer this
argument more as a critique and a hypothesis than as a firm assertion.
For despite two dozen or so original studies on various aspects of
Miranda's impact in thirty-five years, in many ways we still lack fun
damentally good data in this area.61 Nevertheless, what the first gen
eration researchers suggested of their era may be true of ours: that
Miranda's impact in practice is negligible. While Miranda may have
initially exerted a substantial effect on police practices and public atti-

60. Miranda's statistical impact on conviction rates in a sample of cases could be studied
using multiple regression analysis (to hold constant confounding variables) and statistical
significance (to infer likely causation). See Leo, supra note 10, at 676 & n.244. The impact of
Miranda on the "lost" confession rate is, however, unknowable since it presumes a counter
factual world which does not exist and therefore cannot be measured. See Thomas, supra
note 58, at 825-26, 834-37; Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 173-75; Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda
Dead, Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998).
61 . Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 840 ("Even the most informed observers can
offer little beyond speculation on these fundamental subjects.").
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tudes, this impact may have diminished as the criminal j ustice system
adj usted to its dictates, and Miranda became normalized among the
police, prosecutors, and the public. If I am right, this phenomenon
may explain both why police and prosecutors, for the most part, no
longer complain about Miranda, as well as why Miranda is perceived
by many as no longer imposing serious costs on the criminal j ustice
system. My intent here is not to defend Miranda (or, for that matter,
to attack it), but, rather, simply to question what Miranda really deliv
ers in practice. I will suggest not only that Miranda's costs may be
negligible, but that its practical benefits may also be negligible. It may
be time, as Alfredo Garcia has suggested, to reconsider whether
Miranda is even relevant to the type of criminal j ustice system we wish
to have.
B.

Suspects

As many writers have pointed out, the daily stream of detective
shows seems to have educated everyone (in America and abroad)
about the fact and content of the Miranda warning and waiver re
quirements. There has been a widespread diffusion of the Miranda lit
any in American culture not only through television programs, but
also through movies, detective fiction, and the popular press. It is
therefore unlikely that many criminal suspects today hear the Miranda
rights for the first time prior to police questioning; in fact, suspects are
likely to have heard Miranda so many times on television that the
Miranda warnings may have a familiar, numbing ring. A national poll
in 1984 revealed that 93% of those surveyed knew they had a right to
an attorney if arrested,62 and a national poll in 1991 revealed that 80%
knew they had a right to remain silent if arrested.63 With the infusion
and popularity of even more detective shows in the last decade (such
as Homicide, N. Y.P.D. Blue, and Law and Order) , it is likely that
these figures have only gone up. And it is because of these shows and
the mass media more generally - not the police, the legal system or
Supreme Court doctrine - that Miranda has become so much a part
of our national culture.
Despite this knowledge, however, the overwhelming majority of
suspects (some 78% to 96%) waive their rights,64 and thus appear to
consent to interrogation, whether implicitly or explicitly. This fact,
which is enormously significant in evaluating Miranda's impact, has
not been disputed by scholars on any side of the Miranda debate. As

62. Jeffrey Toobin, Viva Miranda, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1987, at 1 1 -12.
63. WALKER, supra note 3, at 51. According to one source, 91 % of all thirteen-year-olds
can already recite the famous Miranda warnings. Nguyen, supra note 44, at 61.
64. Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE MIRANDA
DEBATE, supra note 5, at 275.
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Patrick Malone pointed out fifteen years ago, "Miranda warnings have
little or no effect on a suspect's propensity to talk.... Next to the
warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored
piece of official advice in our society. "65 The same appears to be true
today. This simple fact - which likely explains Miranda's survival bet
ter than the doctrinal underpinnings of the Supreme Court's contorted
post-Miranda jurisprudence - has, for years, baffled social scientists
and legal scholars alike.
There are a number of simple theories (some suspect-centered,
some police-centered) to account for why so high a percentage of sus
pects waive their rights and submit to police questioning. Perhaps the
most obvious explanation is that suspects may not know they can in
voke their rights and terminate interrogation once it has begun. Some
suspects - particularly juveniles, individuals of low intelligence, and
the mentally handicapped or disordered - may not understand the
content or the significance of the warnings. This misunderstanding
may be due to a lack of cognitive capacity to understand, appreciate or
act based on the abstract Miranda warnings. Moreover, even adult
suspects of normal or above average intelligence may not fully com
prehend their Miranda rights because the "inherently compelling"
stresses of police custody and/or impending interrogation cause them
to fail to listen to, register or process the literal meaning of the
Miranda warnings. Other suspects may not understand the full extent
of their rights, such as the right to force the police to stop asking ques
tions, thereby "implicitly" waiving their Miranda rights (perhaps with
out even realizing they are doing so).66 Finally, some suspects may un
derstand the import of the Miranda rights· and may desire to invoke
them but fail to make a legally cognizable assertion of those rights
(e.g., by using indirect and equivocal modes of expression).67
Even if-they have the cognitive capacity to understand the Miranda
rights and register their significance, some suspects may feel that they
have no choice but to comply with their interrogators. In other words,
some suspects simply doubt that the Miranda warnings should be
taken at face value. As Janet Ainsworth has pointed out:

[The suspect is situationally powerless inside the interrogation room be
cause the interrogator controls) the subject matter, tempo, and progress
of the questioning, and [whether the suspect is permitted) to interrupt re
sponses to questions, and to judge whether the responses are satisfactory.
The person questioned, on the other hand, has no right to question the

65. Malone, supra note 4, at 368.
66. See infra Section III.C.2-4.
67. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259, 298-315 (1993).
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interrogator, or even to question the propriety of the questions the inter
rogator has posed.68
Some suspects may feel as if they are under the control of their inter
rogator, who is trained to dominate the police-suspect encounter.
Others may fear that by failing to cooperate they will anger their in
terrogators, who may thereby retaliate against them.69 Innocent sus
pects who lack knowledge about how the system works may perceive
that they will be arrested, incarcerated and/or prosecuted if they do
not cooperate with authorities; guilty suspects may perceive imminent
arrest and prosecution if they do not successfully divert suspicion and
talk their way out of trouble. Silence implies consciousness of guilt,
and thus naturally evokes suspicion.70 Whether innocent or guilty, sus
pects may reasonably perceive that submitting to police questioning is
the only way to exculpate themselves.
Indeed, several scholars have argued, somewhat counter
intuitively, that despite its enunciation of rights and cutoff rules,
Miranda affirmatively encourages suspects to cooperate with their in
terrogators. Patrick Malone has suggested that " [s]killfully presented,
the Miranda warnings themselves sound chords of fairness and sympa
thy at the outset of the interrogation. The interrogator who advises,
who cautions, who offers the suspect the gift of a free lawyer, becomes
all the more persuasive by dint of his apparent candor and reason
ableness."71 David Simon has argued that Miranda
particularly the
Miranda form - lulls suspects into compliance by co-opting them and
making them part of the interrogation process, thereby diffusing the
impact of the Miranda warning.72 I have argued that the ritualistic
Miranda warnings create a felt sense of obligation among suspects to
-

68. Id. at 287.
69. Nguyen, supra note 44, at 61 ("'[If you don't talk], they'll just make stuff up', says
one criminal defendant interviewed for this story, who asked to remain anonymous. 'They'll
lie on your report, so it's on your behalf to just talk to them. Then they'll say you cooper
ated.' ").
70. As one observer as pointed out:
(T)he inmates I interviewed all believed that silence during an interrogation was interpreted
as guilt. They also believed that if the evidence was against them anyway, keeping silence
could get them a stiffer sentence than if they talked as they might be considered uncoopera
tive, a hardened criminal, or something of that sort by the court.
MALIN AKERSTROM, BETRAY AL AND BETRAYERS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF TREACHERY 71
(1991).
71. Malone, supra note 4, at 371.
72. SIMON, supra note 53, at 214 ("[T]he forms have proven essential. Moreover, the
detectives have found that rather than drawing attention to the Miranda warnings, the writ
ten form diffuses the impact of the warning. Even as it alerts a suspect to the dangers of in
terrogation, the form co-opts the suspect, making him part of the process. It is the suspect
who wields the pen, initialing each component of the warning and then signing the form; it is
the suspect who is being asked to help with the paperwork.").
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show respect to the police who question them.73 Perhaps most inter
estingly, George Thomas has argued that Miranda warnings simulta
neously encourage suspects to answer police questions while discour
aging admissions.74 All of these arguments suggest that there may be
multiple and overlapping reasons why so many custodial suspects
waive their rights and so often submit to police questioning.75 It is im
portant to appreciate that each of these explanations is not mutually
exclusive, and thus that many of these factors or pressures to comply
with questioning may be simultaneously present in any given interro.
�oo.
Regardless of why suspects submit to interrogation, however,
Miranda offers very little, if any, meaningful protection, once a s uspect
has waived his rights. While it may prevent some suspects from
speaking to police, Miranda does not restrict deceptive or suggestive
police tactics , manipulative interrogation strategies , hostile or over
bearing questioning styles, lengthy confinement, or any of the inher
ently stressful conditions of modern accusatorial interrogation that
may lead the s uspect to confess.76 Once the interrogator recites the
fourfold warnings and obtains a waiver (and very few suspects subse
quently invoke their Miranda rights after they have been waived),
Miranda is irrelevant to both the process and the outcome of the sub
sequent interrogation. Any protection that Miranda might have of
fered a suspect typically evaporates as soon as an accusatory interro
gation begins - which is exactly when a suspect is most likely to feel
the inherently compelling pressures of police-dominated custodial
questioning.

73. Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and Social Control, 3 Soc. & LEG. ST. 93, 1 1617 (1994 ).
74. Thomas, supra note 58, at 831 ("This double effect could result from a complex in
teraction between cognition and behavior. Understanding that they do not have to talk
might sometimes make suspects more likely to talk because they feel more at ease or feel
they are equal to the interrogators. They might also think that their willingness to talk in the
face of the warnings demonstrates their innocence.").
75. Another possibility, explored in the subsequent section, is that police actively per
suade suspects - either through manipulation, trickery, and/or psychological coercion - to
submit to interrogation, despite the Miranda rights. See infra Section 111.C.
76. As Welsh White has pointed out in this issue, "(i]n the context of twenty-first cen
tury interrogation practices, however, the claim that a suspect's awareness of her rights pro
vides an antidote to the coercive effect of custodial interrogation is either naive or disin
genuous." Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2001); see also Leo, supra note 64, at 275-76.
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Police

Introduction

In 1966 law enforcement in America reacted to Miranda with an
ger.77 Along with Justice White78 and many others,79 police initially
feared that Miranda would handcuff their investigative abilities, not
only ·causing them to lose numerous essential confessions and convic
tions, but also returning rapists and killers to the Streets only to prey
again. Police chiefs predicted chaos, believing that the new Miranda
requirements were the equivalent of a virtual ban on interrogation.80
Contrary to these dire predictions, however, police have successfully
adapted to Miranda in the last four decades. Following an initial ad
justment period, police have learned how to comply with Miranda, or
at least how to create the appearance of compliance with Miranda,
and still successfully elicit a high percentage of incriminating state
ments, admissions, and confessions from criminal suspects. In this sec
tion, I will illustrate how police have devised multiple strategies to
avoid, circumvent, nullify or simply violate Miranda and its invocation
rules in their pursuit of confession evidence. Because American police
have learned how to "work Miranda" to their advantage - i.e., to is
sue Miranda (or avoid having to issue) warnings in strategic ways that
will result in legally accepted waivers
Miranda operates as a weak
-

or minimal restraint on police interrogation, contrary to the intentions
and beliefs of the Warren Court as well as its many contemporary lib
eral and progressive supporters. As one commentator has pointed out,
Miranda has become a "manageable annoyance"81 - the anti-climax

77. When Miranda was decided, Philadelphia Police Commissioner Edward J. Bell de
cried the decision stating, "I do not believe the Constitution was designed as a shield for
criminals." LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 176 (1983). Similarly,
Boston Police Commissioner Edmund L. McNamara complained, "Criminal trials no longer
will be a search for truth, but a search for technical error." Id.
78. In his dissent, Justice White stated that:
There is . . . every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who otherwise
would have been convicted on what this Court has previously thought to· be the most satis-·
factory kind of evidence will now, under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either
not be tried at all or will be acquitted if the State's evidence, minus the confession, is put to
the test of litigation.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966).
79. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule " Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 883, 900 (2000) (quoting position paper critical of Miranda issued by candidate
Richard M. Nixon during the 1968 presidential campaign).
80. Malone, supra note 4, at 367, 376-77. Ironically, some in law enforcemen t now pre
dict "it would be chaos to go back" to a world without Miranda. Brooke A. Masters & Tom
J ackman, Justice System Worries About Miranda: Some Prosecutors, Judges Fear VA Ruling
May Try to Fix Something That Isn't Broken, WASH . POST, Feb. 16, 1999, at Bl.
81. Jan Hoffman, Some Officers are Skirting Miranda Restraints to Get Confessions,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al. See also Peter Carlson, You Have the Right to Remain Si
lent . . . ; But in the Post-Miranda Age, the Police Have Found New and Creative Ways to
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of virtually all custodial police questioning - to American police in
the twenty-first century that does little, if anything, to protect suspects
against abusive interrogation tactics.
2.

A voiding Miranda

a. Recasting Interrogation as a . Non-Custodial Interview. Perhaps
the most fundamental police strategy to successfully negotiate
Miranda is to do an end run around Miranda's requirements by taking
advantage of the definitions, exceptions, and ambiguities in · Miranda
doctrine. Since Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is
legally in custody (i.e., either under arrest or not free to leave),82 police
often redefine the circumstances of questioning so that the suspect
technically is not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings are no
longer required. Police recast what would otherwise be a custodial in
terrogation as a non-custodial interview by telling the suspect that he
is not under arrest and that he is free to leave - sometimes even after
detectives have transported the suspect to the stationhouse with the
express purpose of questioning him inside the interrogation room and
eliciting incriminating information. In this way, police circumvent the
legal necessity of having to issue Miranda warnings or invocation rules
- and thus avoid the risk that the suspect will terminate the interroga
tion by exercising his right to silence or counsel. The shift from custo
dial interrogations to non-custodial interviews following Miranda is, as
several observers have noted, supported by legal doctrine83 as well as
empirical evidence.84

b. Implicit Waivers. Another way in which police use the defini
tions, ambiguities and exceptions of, law to minimize the risk that a
suspect will terminate interrogation is by obtaining a so-called "im
plicit" waiver from suspects. To elicit an "implicit" waiver, an interro
gator must simply read to the su�pect the fourfold Miranda warnings,85
Make You Talk, WASH. P9ST, Sept. 13, 1998, at 10 (" 'There's a lot of ways to get around
Miranda . . . . Most guys know how to get somebody to waive their rights.' ") (quoting for
mer head of Washington, D.C. police homicide unit).

82. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
83. In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court narrowed the definition of custody, holding that
a suspect is in custody when his "freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with
formal arrest.' " 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1 125
(1983) (per curiam)). Berkemer's holding, of course, opens up the possibility that, so long as
they do not effect an arrest, the police may conduct lengthy "interviews" with suspects with
out giving suspects Miranda warnings. See generally Kate Greenwood & Jeffrey A. Brown,
Investigation and Police Practices: Custodia/ Interrogations, 86 GEO. L.J. 1318 (1998).
84. See, e.g., Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 874; Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A.
Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 1 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 (1992).
85. You have the right to remain silent; anything you say can and will be used against
you in a court of law; you have the right to an attorney; if you cannot afford one, one will be
provided to you free of charge.
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but need not ask him whether he understands his rights or wishes to
act on them (what might be called the twofold invocation rules).86 In
stead, after reading the warnings , the interrogator simply launches into
the interrogation. If, after hearing the warnings (but not the invoca
tion rules), the suspect responds to interrogation without invoking his
rights (that is, by saying nothing or answering the interrogator's que
ries), he is said to have implicitly waived his rights, and thereby con
sented to interrogation according to North Carolina v. Butler.87 For
suspects who would otherwise not know that they can ask an interro
gator to re-explain the Miranda rights if they do not understand them
and do not know that they need to answer any questions, the remark
able legal fiction of a so-called "implicit waiver" obviously obviates
the import of the Miranda warnings.
3.

Negotiating Miranda

a. Introduction. Even when they issue the Miranda warnings and
ask suspects whether they wish to respond to questions, police are
enormously successful in moving past the Miranda moment, eliciting
signed waivers, and controlling when interrogation begins and ends. In
the last thirty-five years, police have learned to skillfully employ a
range of sophisticated strategies to induce Miranda waivers and thus
to deliver the warnings and invocation rules in a manner that will not
lead the suspect to invoke his rights or terminate questioning.

b. De-Emphasizing the Significance of the Miranda Warnings. As
Welsh White and I have written about in greater depth elsewhere, in
terrogators often seek to elicit waivers by minimizing, downplaying or
de-emphasizing the potential import or significance of the Miranda
warnings.88 One way interrogators accomplish this goal is by ingrati
ating themselves with suspects prior to the reading of the Miranda
rights, engaging in extensive rapport-building small talk, and person
alizing the police-suspect interaction in order to establish a norm of
friendly reciprocation and the expectation that the suspect will com
ply. Another way interrogators de-emphasize the potential import of
Miranda is by strategically delivering the warnings quickly, in a per
functory tone of voice, and/or in a bureaucratic manner - communi
cating that the warnings are a necessary, but insignificant, technicality.
A third way in which detectives de-emphasize the significance of the
Miranda warnings is by explicitly telling the suspect that the warnings
are unimportant, a mere formality to dispense with prior to question-

86. Do you understand these warnings? Having these rights in mind, do you wish to
speak to me?
87. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
88. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 433; see also Leo, supra note 10, at 662-63.
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ing, or a simple matter of routine. The purpose of all three strategies is
to trivialize the legal significance of Miranda, create the appearance of
a non-adversarial relationship between the interrogators and the sus
pect, and communicate that the interrogator expects the suspect to
passively execute the waiver and respond to subsequent questioning.
As Welsh White and I have written, the interrogator's "hope is that
the s uspect will not come to see the Miranda warning and waiver re
quirements as a crucial transition point in the questioning or as an op
portunity to terminate the interrogation, but as equivalent to other
standard bureaucratic forms that one signs without reading or giving
much thought."89
c. Persuading Suspects to Waive Miranda. Another strategy that in
terrogators sometimes use is to persuade, manipulate and/or deceive a
suspect into waiving Miranda, typically by suggesting (implicitly or ex
plicitly) that he will receive a tangible benefit in exchange for talking
to police. For example, detectives sometimes tell a suspect that he will
only be able to tell his side of the story if he waives Miranda, implying
that the suspect will not be able to clear things up unless he first an
swers their questions.90 Detectives sometimes tell a suspect that they
can only inform the suspect of the charges against him, or the likely
outcome of his case, if he waives Miranda.91 Detectives sometimes ac
cuse a suspect of committing a crime, confront him with real or alleged
evidence, and then suggest that the range of possible sentences and
punishments depends upon how favorably the suspect's actions are
portrayed.92 As Peter Arenella has noted, the implication is clear: if
the suspect waives his Miranda rights, the police can help him (such as
by talking to the prosecutor or testifying on the defendant's behalf); if
the suspect invokes his right to silence or counsel, the police commu
nicate the message that they cannot help him.93 Sometimes detectives
explicitly tell the suspect that the criminal j ustice system will treat him
more leniently if he first waives his rights; otherwise he runs the risk of
being treated more punitively.94 As Yale Kamisar has pointed out, all
of these persuasive strategies amount to interrogation before Miranda
clearly a violation of both the letter and the spirit of Miranda.95

-

89. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 435.
90. See Leo, supra note 10, at 663-66; Leo & White, supra note 49, at 435-36.
91. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 440.
92. SIMON, supra note 53, at 193-207; Leo & White, supra note 49, at 441.
93. Arenella, supra note 43, at 382.
94. SIMON, supra note 53, at 193-207; Leiken, supra note 9, at 22-23; Leo & White, supra
note 49, at 445.
95. Yale Kamisar, Reflections, Special: Retrospective on David Simon's Homicide, 2
JuRIST 1, Feb., 1999. Kamisar writes:
Unfortunately the very police conduct that Miranda tried to forbid seems to be occurring in
Baltimore police stations. The police are threatening the suspect. They are telling him that

1020
4.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1000

Questioning "Outside Miranda": Interrogation After Invocation

If the interrogator fails to elicit an implicit or explicit waiver, he
may seek to change the suspect's mind by persuading him to recon
sider his decision or he may simply continue to question the s uspect in
direct violation of Miranda.96 In the last decade, particularly in
California, numerous police have been trained to question suspects
"outside Miranda"
to continue questioning a suspect who has in
voked one of his Miranda rights by convincing him that his words will
not be used against him. Police typically persuade a suspect who has
invoked his right to silence or counsel to continue answering their
questions by falsely telling him that anything he says is now off the re
-

cord, that nothing he says can be used against him since he has in
voked his constitutional rights, and/or that his answers will only be
used to help the interrogator understand what happened.97 The pur
pose of questioning outside Miranda is to capitalize on the Supreme
Court's ruling in Harris v. New York,98 which established the im
peachment exception to Miranda. As a result of Harris, police can use
incriminating evidence and information (such as the names of wit
nesses, the identities of accomplices or the suspect's modus operandi)
obtained during a Miranda violative interrogation against a defendant
at trial and prosecutors can even use Miran da violative statements to
impeach the defendant at trial should he take the stand. Police inter
rogators question "outside Miranda" precisely because the Supreme
Court created the incentive for them to do so. As several commenta
tors have observed, the practice of questioning "outside Miranda" has
been extensive in the last decade, particularly in California.99
-

unless he talks to them about homicide, they will write it up as a first degree murder and
turn him over to a "bloodsucking" assistant state's attorney. They are tricking the suspect:
They are leading him to believe that it is in his best interest to tell them his side of the story;
indeed, they are pretending that this is the suspect's only chance to get the homicide charge
reduced or dismissed. What they are really doing in Baltimore (and who knows how many
other places) is subjecting individuals to "interrogation" before they waive their rights.
Id. at 6-7.

96. Some interrogators issue what are known as " bifurcated warnings" to leave open the
possibility that they may re-contact suspects who choose to terminate interrogation.
Detectives who use this technique do not tell a suspect about his right to appointed counsel
unless the suspect first waives his right to silence. For if the suspect invokes his right to si
lence, he can still be re-approached for subsequent interrogation. However, if the suspect
invokes his right to counsel, he cannot be re-approached. Seth Rosenfeld, How Improper
Interrogation By Police Derailed a Murder Prosecution, S.F. EXAM., June 18, 2000, at A6; see
also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
97. Leo & White, supra note 49, at 460-463; Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 132-36.
98. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
99. Weisselberg, supra note 41; Weisselberg, supra note 56; Seth Rosenfeld, supra note
96; Seth Rosenfeld, Miranda Ignored - Will it be Erased?, S.F. EXAM., June 10, 2000, at Al.
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The Bigger Picture: The Police Advantage in Miranda

As discussed above in Section II, the lost convictions and system
chaos feared by law enforcement in the immediate . wake of Miranda
have not materialized. Instead, American police have s uccessfully
adapted to the requirements of Miranda in ways that allow them to le
gally dodge the reading of rights or invocation rules, or allow them to
use psychological strategies that result in a surprisingly high percent
age of waivers, or allow both police and prosecutors to use the fruits of
Miranda-violative statements to incriminate suspects. All of these de
velopments are, arguably, exactly the opposite of what the Warren
Court intended when it created the Miranda rules. If the goal of
Miranda was to reduce the kinds of interrogation techniques and cus
todial pressures that create stationhouse compulsion and coercion,
then it appears to have failed miserably:100 The reading of rights and
the taking of waivers. has become, seemingly, an empty ritual,101 and
American police continue to use the same psychological methods of
persuasion, manipulation, and deception that the Warren Court
roundly criticized in Miranda.102 Not only has Miranda largely failed to
achieve its stated and implicit goals, but police have transformed
Miranda into a tool of law enforcement, a public relations coup that
could not have been foreseen at the time it was decided. By largely
controlling when and how the Miranda warnings are issued, as well as
the construction of case facts surrounding Miranda disputes,103
American police have taken the advantage in Miranda.
In other words, for the most part, Miranda has helped,104 not hurt,
law enforcement. As argued above, Miranda has helped law enforce
ment by de facto displacing the case-by-case voluntariness standard as
the primary test of a confession's admissibility, in effect shifting courts'
analysis from the voluntariness of a confession to the voluntariness of
a Miranda waiver.105 By creating the opportunity for police to read
100. SIMON, supra note 53.
101. H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME
IN AMERICA 124 (1996) ("Most people I have spoken to say the warnings have become
largely an empty ritual, embarrassing to cops and superfluous to suspects.").
102. Malone, supra note 4, at 367; Martin Bezsky, Living With Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 43 Drake L. Rev 127, 127 ("Interviews, questioning, and interrogations
are conducted almost exactly as they had been before Miranda, except for the addition of
warning cards in formal settings.").
.

103. DAVID NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE JN MIDDLE AMERICA 187 (1974) ("Al
though we are accustomed to thinking of these cases in terms of the formal law, a more basic
issue is what is happening at the police station. The question over the facts provides the basic
dynamics of the process. Contrary to popular belief, the police have not been overwhelmed
by the Court's decisions because they largely control the facts.").
104. As Peter Arenella has correctly pointed out, "Miranda has actually legitimated
moderately coercive interrogation practices." Arenella, supra note 43, at 387.
105. See Leo, supra note 64.
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suspects their constitutional rights and by allowing police to obtain a
signed waiver form that signifies consensual and non-coercive interro
gation, Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from eviden
tiary challenges, rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or
involuntary confessions.106 Miranda not only fails to provide police
with any guidelines about which police interrogation techniques are
impermissible, but, because it is seen as a symbol of professionalism,
Miranda also reduces the pressure on police to reform their practices
on their own initiative. w7 Perhaps the most telling evidence of
Miranda's lack of harm to law enforcement effectiveness is the fact
that, for the most part, law enforcement supports Miranda.108 Numer
ous members of the law enforcement community have publicly ex
pressed support for Miranda.109 Police, by and large, do not seem to
see the Miranda procedures as an impediment to effective criminal in
vestigation. 1 10 As Schulhofer has pointed out, since the mid-1970s, po
lice have consistently reported that complying with Miranda has not
produced adverse effects for law enforcement. 1 1 1 As others have
pointed out, in the mid-1980s, none of the major police lobbying
groups, such as the International Association of Police Chiefs, joined
in Attorney General Edwin Meese's call to overrule Miranda.112 In
1988, an American Bar Association survey found that an overwhelm
ing majority of police agreed that compliance with Miranda did not
present serious problems for law enforcement or hinder their ability to
garner confessions. 1 13 In 1993, several police organizations (The Police

106. Garcia, supra note 60, a t 478; see also White, supra note 76.
107. Leo, supra note 64; Bezsky, supra note 102.
108. Leo, supra note 10, at 671 . As one police manager reported:
Miranda has been so institutionalized now that it really isn't an impediment to law enforce
ment. The officers understand it, they don't try to get around it, they don't try to play with it.
And what they're basically doing is working with it. . . . Instead of being an impediment,
Miranda has probably made us do our job better. It gives a better appearance. It gives us a
more professional appearance to the prosecutorial staff and t'1e defense bar, and most im
portantly - and I can't emphasize how importantly - it gives us a professional appearance
in the eyes of a jury, the trier of facts. And those are the people we are trying to impress.
They are the ones who must make a decision between guilt and innocence.

·

Id.

109. See Weisselberg, supra note 41, at 165 n.285 (collecting citations).
1 10. See Leo, supra note 10, at 671 ("Yet police officers and detectives no longer view
the Miranda requirements as handcuffing their investigative abilities, but have come to ac
cept Miranda as a legitimate and routine part of the criminal process, simply another aspect
of the rules of the game.").
1 1 1 . Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 507.
1 12. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1 989).
1 1 3. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 28 (1988) ("A very strong
majority of those surveyed - prosecutors, judges, and police officers - agree that compli
ance with Miranda does not present serious problems for law enforcement."); id. ("Police
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Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum, International Union
of Police Associations, and the National Black Police Association)
filed amicus curae briefs on behalf of Miranda in Withrow v.
Williams.114 To be sure, a number of law enforcement organizations
recently filed Amicus Curae briefs in support of Dickerson v. United
States, but these briefs appear to be the result of Paul Cassell's impres
sive lobbying and advocacy efforts, not the natural inclination of law
enforcement, on its own, to abandon Miranda. If there is, in fact, wide
spread opposition to Miranda, ·police in the trenches have expressed
surprisingly little desire to overrule it.1 15
D.

Prosecutors

Surprisingly, the empirical study of Miranda's impact has almost
entirely neglected the ruling's effects on the practices, attitudes, and
decisionmaking of prosecutors. Prosecutors are, arguably, the most
powerful and important actor in the criminal j ustice system. Their dis
cretion - especially with the rise of determinate sentencing schemes
- is simply unmatched by any other actors in the criminal j ustice sys
tem. Prosecutors decide whether to drop or file charges, the amount
and type of charges to file, whether to recommend bail and at what
amount, whether to engage in plea bargaining, and, if so, which
charging and sentencing outcomes to recommend to courts. Any fail
ure to properly issue Miranda warnings, any violation of Miranda's in
vocation rules, as well as any police misconduct or illegality during in
terrogation can be undone by the prosecutor with a stroke of a pen.
Future Miranda impact studies need to examine the influence of
Miranda on the gate-keeping function and decisionmaking of prosecu
tors if we are to have a complete understanding of its real world ef
fects.1 16
In the last thirty-five years, there has been only one academic
study of prosecutorial attitudes toward Miranda. In 198 1 , John Gruhl
and Cassia Spohn published a study analyzing 195 questionnaires from
local prosecutors in forty-three states. They found that local prosecu-

witnesses consistently testified that they comply with Miranda and still obtain statements
from many suspects.").
1 14. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). These four organizations asked the Supreme Court to keep
Miranda claims within the reach of federal habeas corpus in part because, "[t)he law en
forcement community has seen the enforcement of Miranda and its progeny lead to an in
creased professionalism within police and sheriff's departments throughout the country.
Miranda's bright-line rules have proven relatively easy to follow." Brief Amici Curiae of the
Police Foundation et al. in Support of Respondent at 7, Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680
(1983) (No. 91-1030).
115. Arenella, supra note 43, at 380.
1 16. Gruhl & Spohn, supra note 29, at 33.
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tors overwhelmingly supported Miranda.117 Over 81 % of the prosecu
tors surveyed agreed that police should be required to read suspects
their rights. However, 69% believed that the Courts should continue
to reduce the strictness with which Miranda was applied, though most
felt that the Burger Court's post-Miranda rulings - including Harris
v. New York's holding that police could use illegally obtained state
ments to impeach a suspect's credibility at trial - had a limited effect
on their decisions to prosecute.118 Instead, Gruhl and Spohn found that
the primary influence on prosecuting attorneys' practices was the de
gree to which local j udges required strict adherence to the Miranda
guidelines. 1 19
Gruhl and Spohn's finding of overwhelming prosecutorial support
for Miranda is consistent with other sources of data. In the 1 988
American Bar Association survey of criminal j ustice practitioners, for
example, prosecutors reported that Miranda was not a significant fac
tor that impedes their ability to prosecute criminals successfully.120 On
the contrary, as George Thomas and others have pointed out, Miranda
facilitates the prosecutor's task of getting statements admitted, gaining
leverage during plea-bargaining and ultimately winning convictions.121
Prosecutors like Miranda because it makes law enforcement appear
more professional,122 causes juries to attach greater weight to confes
sion evidence, 123 and allows prosecutors to argue that an otherwise in
voluntary confession was constitutionally obtained.1 24 Just as impor
tantly, Miranda rarely imposes significant costs on prosecutors; it is
rare that an admission or confession will be suppressed from evidence
in trial proceedings because of a Miranda violation.125 In short, there

1 17. Id. at 35.
1 1 8. Id. at 40-41.
1 19. Id. at 43.
120. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 1 13, at 9. This is consistent with
Younger's finding more than twenty years earlier - that the Miranda requirements did not
decrease the percentage of felony complaints issued by prosecutors or the success in prose
cuting cases at the preliminary stage or at trial. Younger, supra note 9, at 262.
121. Thomas, supra note 5, at 18-22 �
122. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 113, at 8, 20.
123. Id. at 29.
124. Garcia, supra note 60.
125. In a study of criminal courts in nine medium-sized counties (ranging from 100,000
to 1 million) in I llinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, Nardulli found that only five of 7,035
cases (.07%) resulted in lost convictions as a result of judges suppressing confessions. Peter
F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 585, 601 (1983). In a subsequent study of 2,759 cases in the city of Chicago,
Nardulli reported that judges suppressed confessions in .04% of all cases. Peter F. Nardulli,
The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 232. Guy
and Huckabee found that only 12 of 2,354 cases (.51 %) appealed to either the Indiana
Supreme Court or the Indiana Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1986 resulted in exclusion of
evidence as a result of Miranda violations. Karen L. Guy & Robert G. Huckabee, Going
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are a number of reasons why Miranda benefits prosecutors without
undermining effective law enforcement.
E.

Trial Courts

Miranda has also eased the lot of trial j udges - to the likely det
riment of criminal defendants. By creating a seemingly objective,
regular, and consistent rule, Miranda has made it far simpler for trial
courts to decide whether a confession should be admitted into evi
dence. As Malone has pointed out, "staccato Miranda conversations,
with their uniform statements and check the box answers, are easier
for courts to evaluate than sprawling hours-long interrogations."126
The cost of this simplification, however, appears to be borne by the
accused. Virtually all observers seem to agree that Miranda has shifted
the legal inquiry from whether the confession was voluntarily given to
whether the Miranda rights were voluntarily waived. The Supreme
Court has said as much in Dickerson, observing that when the police
have "adhered to the dictates of Miranda,'' a defendant will rarely be
able to make even "a colorable argument that his self-incriminating
statement was compelled."127 As White points out, "A finding that the
police have properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights thus
often has the effect of minimizing the scrutiny afforded interrogation
practices following the Miranda waiver."128 Others have gone further,
suggesting that as long as Miranda warnings were given, courts ig
nored interrogation misconduct, freeing the police to coerce suspects
as long as they had first Mirandized them.129 There is data to support
this view. A survey of recent decisions by Welsh White suggests that
once police have complied with Miranda and received a waiver, it is,
indeed, difficult to establish that the defendant's confession was co
erced or involuntaryP0 Thus, while Miranda has done very little to
change the psychological methods and process of interrogation, it has
changed, de facto, the standard by which confessions are admissible

Free on a Technicality: Another Look at the Effect of the Miranda Decision on the Criminal
Justice Process, 4 CRIM. JUST. RES. BULL. 1 (1988). Even Paul Cassell concedes that success
ful pre-trial Miranda suppression motions are rare, and that courts rarely reverse a convic
tion on appeal because of a motion to suppress under Miranda. Cassell, supra note 9, at 39293. As Alex Nguyen points out, having a conviction reversed because of a Miranda violation
is so rare that many long time police and prosecutors have never seen it happen. Nguyen,
supra note 44, at 60.

126. Malone, supra note 4, at 377.
127. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000).
128. White, supra note 76, at 1220.
129. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 742-47 (1992);
see also Leo, supra note 64, at 276-77; Malone, supra note 4, at 377-79; Garcia, supra note 60,
at 465, 475-76.
130. White, supra note 76, at 1219.
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into evidence, creating a bright line but diminishing the salience and
effectiveness of the voluntariness test by lulling j udges into admitting
confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.131 For if a dispute
over the facts arises - the so-called "swearing contest" - j udges vir
tually always believe the police officer's testimony, especially if the
suspect had signed a written waiver.132
III. CONCLUSION: MIRANDA , VIDEOTAPING, AND THE FUTURE OF
EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP

Miranda is one of the most well-known and controversial Supreme
Court decisions in American history, simultaneously celebrated and
reviled. There is no question that Miranda has been enormously influ
ential in the last four decades, redefining the character of police inter
rogation as we now know it. Elsewhere, I have argued that Miranda
has exercised a long term impact on police behavior, court cases, and
popular consciousness in at least four ways.133 First, Miranda increased
the professionalism of police detectives, removing the last entrenched
vestiges of the third degree.134 Second, Miranda has transformed the
culture of police detecting in America by fundamentally reframing
how police talk and think about the process of custodial interrogation.
Third, Miranda has increased public awareness of constitutional rights.
And fourth, Miranda has inspired police to develop more specialized,
more sophisticated, and seemingly more effective interrogation tech
niques with which to elicit inculpatory statements from custodial sus
pects.
Despite its influence on policing in the 1960s and 1970s, however,
Miranda's impact in the twenty-first century appears rather limited.135
In the last four decades, police, prosecutors, and courts have all
adapted to and diluted Miranda, using it to advance their own bureau
cratic objectives rather than to meaningfully enforce the privilege

131. Thomas, supra note 121, at 31 ("Lower courts routinely admitted confessions using
the voluntariness test in the Pre-Miranda days, but today's judges have grown up (as judges
at least) with the Miranda rule firmly in place . . . powerful institutional pressures encourage
judges to admit confessions. Unless the judge believes the confession to be false, suppressing
the confession will deprive the state of its strongest evidence and might result in a guilty de
fendant going free. Current judges might experience these institutional pressures and react
in the same way as judges from the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s.").
132. Leo, supra note 10, at 687; Neubauer, supra note 9, at 163-88; Anthony G.
Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 785 (1970).
133. Leo, supra note 10, at 668-75.
134. This point was also raised in Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 1417, 1444 (1985). See also SIMON, supra note 53, at 199.
135. See supra Section Il.B.
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against self-incrimination or the right to counsel.136 Once feared to be
the equivalent of sand in the machinery of criminal j ustice, Miranda
has now become a standard part of the machine. Police have learned
how t� sidestep the necessity of Miranda or to use clever strategies to
elicit a high percentage of Miranda waivers. Prosecutors have learned
to use Miranda to facilitate the admission of confession evidence, to
add leverage to plea bargaining negotiations, and to buttress cases at
trial. And trial j udges have learned to use Miranda to simplify the de
cision to admit interrogation-induced statements and to sanitize con
fessions that might otherwise be deemed involuntary if analyzed solely
under the more rigorous Fourteenth Amendment due process volun
tariness standard.
Miranda imposes few, if any, serious costs on the individual actors
of the criminal j ustice system or the system as a whole; by virtually all
accounts, it is a low-cost proposition. It does not impede effective law
enforcement. Contrary to the arguments of Paul Cassell, there is no
compelling evidence that Miranda causes a significant number of lost
convictions - certainly not the tens and hundreds of thousands of
convictions lost annually that Cassell imputes to Miranda.137 Indeed,
the best evidence suggests that this difficult-to-ascertain figure is likely
to be very low.
If Miranda in 2001 imposes low costs on those whom it was in
tended to regulate, it also offers few benefits for its intended recipi
ents. Contrary to the visions of its creators, Miranda does not mean
ingfully dispel compulsion inside the interrogation room. Miranda has
not changed the psychological interrogation process that it excoriated,
but has only motivated police to develop more subtle and sophisti
cated - and arguably more compelling - interrogation strategies.
How police "work" Miranda in practice makes a mockery of the no
tion that a suspect is effectively apprised of his rights and has a con
tinuous opportunity to exercise them. Miranda offers no protection
against traditionally coercive interrogation techniques, but may have,
instead, weakened existing legal safeguards in this area. And Miranda
offers suspects little, .if any, protection against the elicitation a°'d ad
mission into evidence of false confessions. As a safeguard, Miranda
produces very few benefits.

136. Miranda is an inherently weak safeguard; as Yale Kamisar has pointed out, "[a]
system that allows the police themselves (rather than a magistrate or other judicial officer)
to obtain waivers of a person's constitutional rights - and to do so without requiring the
presence of a disinterested observer or a tape recording of the proceedings - is an inher
ently weak procedural safeguard." Yale Kamisar, Miranda Does Not Look So Awesome
Now, LEGAL TIMES, June 10, 1996, at A22.
137. See supra Section 11.B.
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As many scholars seem to agree,138 electronic audio- or video
recording· of interrogations is the most promising interrogation reform
of our era.139 Like Miranda, video-taping imposes few costs, but unlike
Miranda video-taping promises high benefits. The fundamental value
of electronic recording is that it creates an objective, comprehensive,
and reviewable record of the interrogation for all parties. By preserv
ing the evidentiary record, electronic recording eliminates the swear
ing contest, improves police practice, reduces court costs by prevent
ing unnecessary litigation about what did or did not occur during
interrogation, and provides criminal j ustice officials and triers of fact
with the necessary data to make informed decisions about truth and
justice. By preserving the evidentiary record for all to see, electronic
recording deters false allegations of impropriety j ust as it deters police
misconduct inside the interrogation room. To be sure, electronic re
cording is a means, not an end: it leaves unanswered the enduring le
gal and moral questions that animate· criminal procedure, such as
when interrogation pressure becomes excessive, what constitutes an
involuntary statement, and how much we ought to value confession
evidence. Still, electronic recording coupled with a return to a mean
ingful voluntariness standard - what Bill Stuntz calls "voluntariness
with better evidence"140 - may be a far superior basis for dispelling
coercion, regulating overbearing police methods, and preventing false
confessions than the overrated Miranda regime.
Apart from its value as a policy reform, the electronic recording of
interrogation provides scholars with a virtually unrivaled (and hereto
fore virtually unplumbed) source of empirical data. Scholars who wish
to better understand the contemporary, real world impact of Miranda,
as well as what happens inside police interrogation rooms after
Miranda is waived and why, might consider studying the case files and
videotapes of interrogations in Alaska and Minnesota, where elec-

138. E.g., Leo, supra note 10, at 681-92; Cassell, supra note 9, at 486-92; Wayne T.
Westling & Vicki Waye, Videotaping Police Interrogations: Lessons From Australia, 25 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 493 (1998).
139. In both Alaska and Minnesota, police are required by law to electronically record
interrogations. Stephan v. State, 71 1 P.2d 1 156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (holding that "an unex
cused failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of deten
tion violates a suspect's right to due process, under the Alaska Constitution, and that any
statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible"); State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d 587, 592
(Minn. 1994) (holding that "all custodial interrogation including any information about
rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be re
corded when questioning occurs at a place of detention. If the law enforcement officers fail
to comply with this recording requirement, any statements the suspect makes in response to
the interrogation may be suppressed at trial. . . . [S]uppression will be required of any state
ments obtained in violation of the recording requirement if the violation is deemed 'substan
tial.' ").
140. William J. Stuntz, Miranda 's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 996 (2001).
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tronic recording of all interrogations is mandated by law.141 Assuming
police cooperation, the preservation of records, and sufficient re
sources, scholars could randomly select cases and study, both qualita
tively and quantitatively, the impact of Miranda on police work, case
processing, and conviction rates.142 Although it is impossible to ascer
tain the number of lost confessions as a result of Miranda, with an
adequate sample size scholars could - using multiple regression
analysis to control potentially confounding variables and statistical
significance to infer likely causation - measure whether Miranda de
presses, increases or has no effect on current conviction rates. Scholars
could, in addition, do matched j urisdiction studies - comparing police
files and videotapes in a j urisdiction that has videotaping with the po
lice files of a demographically similar jurisdiction that does not - to
analyze the impact of videotaping on police work, case processing, and
conviction rates. Such a study might begin to resolve some of the em
pirical and legal debates that have animated the first and second gen
eration of Miranda impact scholarship. It might also help us better understand whether Miranda, and all that Miranda requires and entails,
is all that relevant to regulating police interrogation in the twenty-first
century.

141. See supra note 139. Some police departments voluntarily record interrogations.
William A. Geller, Police Videotaping of Suspect Interrogations and Confessions (1992) (A
Report to the National Institute of Justice, unpublished manuscript).
142. George Thomas has made similar suggestions. Thomas, supra note 58, at 833-37.
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